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ABSTRACT
Long payment terms are a strong impediment to the entry and survival of liquidity constrained
ﬁrms. To test this idea and its implications, I consider the eﬀect of a reform restricting the trade
credit supply of French trucking ﬁrms. In a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences setting, I ﬁnd that trucking
ﬁrms’ corporate default probability drops by one-fourth following the restriction. The eﬀect is
persistent, concentrated among liquidity constrained ﬁrms, and not oﬀset by a drop in proﬁts. The
restriction also triggers an increase in the entry of small trucking ﬁrms.
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Nonﬁnancial ﬁrms are the main providers of short-term corporate ﬁnancing to their customers.
Accounts payable are three times as large as bank loans and ﬁfteen times as large as commercial
paper on the aggregate balance sheet of nonﬁnancial U.S. businesses.1 Moreover, interﬁrm lending
ﬁnances a disproportionate share of global trade.2 Yet despite its economic signiﬁcance, trade credit
supply has received little attention relative to ﬁrms’ other ﬁnancial and real activities, mainly due
to the lack of appropriate empirical setting.3 In particular, the implications of trade credit provision
for ﬁrms’ corporate liquidity remain poorly understood.
While ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms can extend trade credit to their customers in the form of long
payment terms, their ﬁnancially weaker rivals might expose themselves to liquidity shocks by doing
so. Depending on the intensity of competition, they might not be able to pass this excess liquidity
risk onto prices. Long payment terms extended by ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms might thus prevent their
constrained rivals from entering, expanding, and surviving in the industry. The main challenge in
identifying this mechanism is that ﬁrms compete on many dimensions, and that ﬁnancially stronger
ﬁrms might have other comparative advantages over their constrained competitors.
To solve this identiﬁcation challenge, I exploit a large and exogenous restriction on trade credit
supply. I consider a trade credit regulation reform enacted in 2006 that prevented French trucking
ﬁrms from agreeing with their customers to payment terms in excess of thirty days. This resulted
in a signiﬁcant drop by 15% in payment terms relative to their pre-reform level. I use a unique
dataset covering the universe of all French ﬁrms and implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID)
approach to estimate the eﬀect of this trade credit restriction on trucking ﬁrms’ corporate policies,
entry and exit. To do so, I compare the performance of trucking ﬁrms to the performance of a
control group including all industries that do not use trucking services and have similar customers
and suppliers as trucking ﬁrms. I conﬁrm that all results are robust to using an alternative control
group constructed by matching each trucking ﬁrm with a non-trucking ﬁrm with similar ﬁrm-level
characteristics, such as size, proﬁtability, tangibility, leverage, and trade credit supply.4
I ﬁrst ask whether long payment terms impose a liquidity risk on ﬁrms, especially ﬁnancially
constrained ones. There is no obvious reason a priori that this should be the case. Accounts
receivable are typically considered as liquid assets that should be converted into cash relatively easily
in the event of a liquidity shock. In addition, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms might extend shorter
payment terms than unconstrained ones in order to avoid begin exposed to excessive liquidity risk.
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Instead, I ﬁnd that the large decrease in accounts receivable is matched by a sizable increase by
three percentage points in cash holdings. Most importantly, the probability that a trucking ﬁrm
ﬁles for bankruptcy falls by 60 basis points, a one-fourth drop with respect to the pre-restriction
level. The eﬀect is extremely robust across alternative speciﬁcations and control groups. It shows
no prior trends and remains persistent six years after the trade credit restriction. The eﬀect is
concentrated among small, young, cash-poor, highly levered, and low payout ﬁrms, which are more
likely to be liquidity constrained. Altogether, the results provide consistent evidence that payment
terms impose a substantial liquidity risk on ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms and force them into ﬁnancial
distress more often than if they were paid earlier.
I then check whether ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms are compensated for the liquidity risk they take
by extending trade credit. It may be the case that constrained ﬁrms charge higher prices than
unconstrained ones to cover their higher liquidity risk. However, I ﬁnd that the drop in corporate
default among constrained ﬁrms is not oﬀset by a drop in their earnings. This suggests that,
in a competitive market where customers value trade credit, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms expose
themselves to liquidity risk by extending trade credit, which they are not able to oﬀset with higher
prices. Hence, liquidity constrained ﬁrms seem to be made relatively better oﬀ by the reform.
Surprisingly, the restriction of the contract set imposed by this trade credit regulation reform thus
leads to a net improvement in the risk-adjusted proﬁts of some market participants.
I also examine whether the liquidity risk associated with trade credit supply acts as a barrier
to entry for ﬁnancially constrained entrepreneurs. Again, there is no obvious reason why this
should be the case, given that accounts receivable are relatively liquid assets, and that constrained
entrepreneurs could in theory choose to extend shorter payment terms in order to reduce liquidity
risk. However, I ﬁnd that entry goes up in the trucking sector following the trade credit restriction.
The increase is concentrated among small businesses, shows no prior trend, and starts to kick in
one year after the reform. I ask whether this might be the result of low quality entrepreneurs taking
advantage of the lower working capital requirements to enter the sector. I ﬁnd instead that the
productivity of entrants is not lower after the reform than before. This is consistent with the idea
that long payment terms extended by ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms raises the hurdle for ﬁrms to enter
and survive in the industry. From a broader perspective, these results conﬁrm that trade credit
supply acts as a barrier to the entry and survival of liquidity constrained yet productive businesses.
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The ﬁndings shed light on the implications of the recent set of reforms undertaken in the
U.S. and in the European Union (E.U.) aimed at accelerating payments to small businesses. On
September 14, 2011, the U.S. deployed the QuickPay initiative, whereby all federal agencies were
obligated to pay their small business contractors within 15 days instead of 30 days.5 On March
16, 2013, the E.U. enacted Directive 2011/7/EU preventing suppliers and customers from agreeing
to payment terms in excess of 60 days, unless they specify otherwise in writing.6 The underlying
idea, which is often echoed in the press and in business surveys both in the U.S. and the E.U., is
that extending trade credit is costly for small businesses. In particular, policymakers are concerned
that long payment terms may impose excess default risk on ﬁrms.7 The results presented in this
paper conﬁrm that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are at a comparative disadvantage in sectors with
long payment terms, and that they seem to be made better oﬀ by a trade credit restriction. Yet,
for any regulation of trade credit to be welfare improving, there would have to be an ineﬃciently
high level of trade credit provision ex-ante, a question that is beyond the scope of this study.
This paper belongs to the growing literature on trade credit, which has received less attention
than other sources of corporate ﬁnancing such as bank debt, despite its economic importance. This
stream of research has argued that ﬁrms extend ﬁnancing to their corporate customers because they
have an advantage over ﬁnanciers in dealing with adverse selection (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) or
with moral hazard (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004).8 While this paper does not speak to the drivers
of trade credit, the reform that I analyze allows for a clean identiﬁcation of the interaction of trade
credit supply with other corporate policies. In particular, the ﬁndings highlight that long payment
terms absorb enough of ﬁrms’ liquidity to impact entry and exit.9 This mechanism is likely to
be ampliﬁed during episodes of credit market stress, when external ﬁnance becomes scarce, thus
amplifying the comparative advantage of ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms over ﬁnancially weaker ones
through their ability to supply trade credit.10
I also build on prior work exploring the interplay between ﬁnancing frictions and industry
dynamics, starting with Telser (1966) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), who argue that deep-
pocketed ﬁrms can lower industry proﬁts to accelerate the exit of their ﬁnancially constrained rivals.
My ﬁndings indicate that long payment terms are another mechanism through which ﬁnancial
constraints aﬀect ﬁrms’ entry and exit. Therefore, they complement existing empirical evidence
that ﬁrms with high levels of leverage or low levels of cash holdings tend to lose market share to
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their rivals (Phillips, 1995; Kovenock and Phillips, 1995, 1997; Campello, 2003; Campello and Fluck,
2006; Fresard, 2010), or to lower quality in order to preserve current cash ﬂows for debt service
(Matsa, 2011b). They also relate to prior work showing that incumbents’ capital structure inﬂuences
their rivals’ entry (Chevalier, 1995a,b; Khanna and Tice, 2000; Boutin, Cestone, Fumagalli, Pica,
and Serrano-Velarde, 2013), and that product market competition inﬂuences ﬁms’ capital structure
decisions (Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala, 2014). In a related paper, Zingales (1998) considers the
eﬀect of the wave of entry and price liberalization in the U.S. trucking industry and ﬁnds that highly
levered ﬁrms are less likely to invest, and thus more likely to exit. The impact of the trade credit
regulation reform also illustrates how capital market imperfections aﬀect the survival of productive
ﬁrms, but the mechanism relies instead on working capital investment and its eﬀect on short-term
corporate liquidity.
At a broad level, the ﬁndings presented in this paper contribute to our understanding of the real
eﬀect of liquidity constraints. In the presence of adverse selection (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981))
or moral hazard (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)), entrepreneurs may be unable to raise outside
ﬁnance and may consequently need to forgo some proﬁtable investment opportunities. Financing
frictions may aﬀect entrepreneurs’ decisions on the intensive margin (whether to invest and expand
or not), as well as the extensive margin (whether to enter, and to exit). The ﬁrst margin has been
explored in a number of studies, starting with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), who ﬁnd
a strong positive relationship between cash ﬂows and investment.11 Consistent with the results
presented here, Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) show
that constrained ﬁrms hold less working capital and hoard less cash than they would in the absence
of ﬁnancial constraints. In contrast, I focus on the eﬀects of liquidity constraints on the extensive
margin, that is, on ﬁrms’ entry and exit, which has received less attention in the literature, with the
exception of Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), or Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,
and Rosen (1994). The rich dataset I use combines ﬁrm-level data with information on business
creations and defaults for the universe of French ﬁrms, which enables me to carefully analyze how
short-term corporate liquidity impacts the entry and survival of constrained entrepreneurs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the theory and evidence on
trade credit and details the main hypotheses. Section II presents the trade credit regulation reform,
which serves as the main source of identiﬁcation in this paper. Section III details the identiﬁcation
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strategy. Section IV presents the data. Section V describes the results. I discuss the results in
Section VI, and Section VII concludes.
I. Theoretical Framework
When there are contractual frictions between customers and external ﬁnanciers, trade credit
may be a crucial source of short-term corporate ﬁnancing. The ability to extend trade credit might
therefore aﬀect ﬁrms’ entry, expansion, and survival. In what follows, I present the main theories
of trade credit provision, which serve as a basis for the hypotheses tested in this paper.
A. Theories of Trade Credit
Prior work has argued that trade credit is a form of ﬁnancing used to overcome the impediments
customers face in funding their investment opportunities.12 Petersen and Rajan (1997) use the
National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) and document that ﬁrms with better access
to credit from ﬁnancial institutions in turn oﬀer more trade credit. But why would ﬁrms be willing
to ﬁnance their customer when ﬁnancial intermediaries would not?
Smith (1987) and Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that ﬁrms have an informational advantage
over other types of external investors, allowing them to better screen solvent customers. Consistent
with this idea, McMillan and Woodruﬀ (1999) ﬁnd that ﬁrms lend to their constrained customers,
and that longer trading relationships are associated with more credit provision. In Brennan, Mak-
simovic, and Zechner (1988), trade credit is used by ﬁrms to discriminate between their cash-rich
and cash-poor customers when price discrimination is not allowed.
In another vein, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) hypothesize that it is typically less proﬁtable for
an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash, which increases the advantage of
ﬁrms over banks in lending to their customers. This theory predicts that producers of diﬀerentiated
goods, which are typically harder to divert, should extend more trade credit. Empirical evidence
based on the NSSBF in Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) conﬁrms that diﬀerentiated goods
are oﬀered with longer payment terms.
The advantage of trade partners over external ﬁnanciers may also be nested in the speciﬁcity of
the supplier-customer relationship. Wilner (2000) argues that ﬁrms are more willing than banks to
6
grant concessions to customers in debt renegotiation to sustain trade relationships. Cun˜at (2007)
posits that once relationship-speciﬁc investments have been made, customers have weaker incentives
to default on their suppliers than on their banks, while suppliers have stronger incentives to lend
to customers experiencing ﬁnancial distress.
Finally, ﬁrms could attribute a larger value to the collateral of their ﬁnancially constrained
customers than would external ﬁnanciers; they might thus be willing to oﬀer credit when banks
may not. Consistent with this idea, Longhofer and Santos (2003) and Frank and Maksimovic (2005)
relate trade credit provision to ﬁrms’ advantage in liquidating intermediate goods in case of default
by their customers.
The common feature of these theories is that the production process creates a comparative
advantage for nonﬁnancial ﬁrms over ﬁnancial intermediaries in providing short-term corporate
ﬁnancing to their customers. A joint prediction of these theories is that payment terms should
be clustered by industry, as they are very much dependent on the respective positions of the
ﬁrm and its customer in the supply chain. Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) and, more recently,
Costello (2013), provide compelling contract-level evidence that there is indeed signiﬁcant variation
in payment terms across industries, but much less so within industries. Hence, operating in a given
industry requires not only the ability to achieve technological and organizational eﬃciency, but
also the capacity to extend trade credit. However, ﬁrms may diﬀer in their ability to do so due to
heterogeneous exposure to liquidity constraints.13
B. Hypotheses
I borrow from Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) to derive the set of hypotheses tested in this paper.
In this setting, entrepreneurs use wealth and external funds to ﬁnance the initial ﬁxed cash outlay
required to operate in an industry. In the presence of moral hazard, the entrepreneur must be given
a minimum share of the claims on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in order to produce eﬀort. This prevents some
projects with positive net present value from being ﬁnanced. In particular, a liquidity shock hitting
the ﬁrm can force it into liquidation even though it has a positive continuation value, because the
future income that can be pledged to ﬁnanciers is too low. Firms hold liquid reserves ex-ante to
ensure against this risk. There are three possible outcomes, depending on the entrepreneur’s initial
wealth. Those with enough initial wealth can raise external funding, hoard the ﬁrst-best level of
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cash, and always continue a project after a liquidity shock when it is eﬃcient to do so. On the other
hand, entrepreneurs with too little initial wealth cannot raise enough ﬁnance to pay the cash outlay
to enter the market in the ﬁrst place. Entrepreneurs with intermediate levels of initial wealth can
raise funding and enter the industry, but they are terminated when the liquidity shock outsizes
what they can pledge to ﬁnanciers, despite the fact that the net present value of continuation is
positive. A natural prediction of this model is that, everything else being equal, a larger cash outlay
required to operate in an industry leads to more liquidations of eﬃcient ﬁrms, and to less entry
of cash-poor entrepreneurs. This model is useful to think about how trade credit supply interacts
with ﬁnancial strength to aﬀect liquidations and business creations, and about how a restriction
on payment terms might aﬀect ﬁrm dynamics in the trucking industry.
Do long payment terms impose liquidity risk on ﬁrms, especially ﬁnancially constrained ones?
There is no obvious reason a priori that this should be the case. In principle, accounts receivable
are liquid assets that should be converted into cash relatively easily in the event of a liquidity
shock. Firms could sell their accounts receivable to banks or factoring companies in such instances.
In the simple model presented above, the ability to liquidate or securitize the initial cash outlay
would indeed mitigate the ineﬃcient discontinuation of eﬃcient ﬁrms.14 Furthermore, trade credit
would not force excess liquidation on constrained ﬁrms if they could extend shorter payment terms
than those extended by unconstrained ﬁrms. In the framework of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
constrained ﬁrms can mitigate ineﬃcient liquidation by reducing the size of the initial cash outlay.
However, if the demand is very elastic to payment terms, then constrained ﬁrms might have to oﬀer
long payment terms and bear liquidity risk by doing so. Everything else being equal, following a
restriction on payment terms, on average, the probability of ﬁnancial distress should decrease, and
more so for ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms than for ﬁnancially stronger ones.15
Are ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms compensated for the liquidity risk they take in extending long
payment terms? Constrained ﬁrms could trade-oﬀ liquidity risk with the level of proﬁts. It could
be the case, for instance, that they pass the excess default risk they take onto prices. However, the
nature of their competitive landscape might prevent them from doing so. Constrained ﬁrms might
have to oﬀer the same price and payment terms as unconstrained incumbents. If this is the case,
then following a restriction on payment terms, the drop in the liquidity risk of constrained ﬁrms
should not be oﬀset by a relatively larger reduction in their proﬁts.16 Although the trade credit
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reform restricts their ability to freely contract with their customers, it might thus be the case that
ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms end up beneﬁting from the reform.
Do long payment terms prevent the entry of new businesses? In Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
entrepreneurs need to have enough initial wealth to be able to raise external funding to cover the
initial cash outlay required to start their operations. Long payment terms amount to a large cash
outlay, and they might thus act as a barrier to entry for entrepreneurs with low initial wealth. If the
restriction on payment terms reduces the initial cash outlay without aﬀecting earnings, we might
see the entry of constrained entrepreneurs increase in the trucking industry after the reform.17
II. The 2006 Trade Credit Regulation Reform
A. The Trade Credit Regulation Reform
The main source of identiﬁcation in this paper is a trade credit regulation reform that came
into eﬀect in France on January 5, 2006. It oﬀers a unique opportunity to study the implications
of trade credit supply, to the extent that it had a large, sudden, and direct eﬀect on the balance
sheet of the entire population of ﬁrms in one speciﬁc industry.
[Place Figure I about here]
This reform restricted the length of contractual payment terms to a maximum of thirty days
in transactions involving a seller aﬃliated to one of six four-digit industries related to road trans-
portation. As displayed in Table I below, nine out of ten ﬁrms aﬀected by the reform are trucking
ﬁrms – the remainder include transportation services ﬁrms. In the interest of clarity, I refer to
these ﬁrms collectively as “treated ﬁrms” or “trucking ﬁrms” throughout the paper. Following
the reform, trucking ﬁrms and their customers are both subject to a 75,000 euro ﬁne if they agree
to payment terms longer than thirty days. Two mechanisms ensure that the reform is enforced.
First, the French competition administration conducts investigations among French ﬁrms. Second,
ﬁrms’ statutory accounting auditors must report excess contractual payment terms to the Ministry
of Finance, the equivalent of the U.S. Department of Commerce. It is important to emphasize
that the reform did not aﬀect the enforcement or penalties associated with late payment, that is,
to payments occurring beyond the agreed payment term. Instead, the law restricted contractual
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payment terms only.
The impact of the reform on the accounts receivable of trucking ﬁrms was dramatic. Figure I
presents the mean and conﬁdence interval at the 1% level of the ratio of receivables over sales in the
transportation and logistics sector in France from 1996 to 2011, as reported by the French Central
Bank (Banque de France).18 The graph highlights that payment terms collapse to a historically
low level following the enactment of the reform. Mean receivables over sales drop by 3 percentage
points between 2005 and 2007. This amounts to a cut in average payment terms by almost two
weeks, or to a 15% drop with respect to their median level in 2005, one year before the trade credit
restriction.19 Although the eﬀect of the reform on payment terms appears to be signiﬁcant, one
concern might be that the reform was not fully enforced. In theory, ﬁrms could attempt to contract
around the reform. A ﬁrst possibility would be for the ﬁrm to charge a lower penalty rate when the
customer pays late.20 A second way would be for the ﬁrm to delay invoicing.21 However, the large
drop in accounts receivable and the signiﬁcant oﬀsetting increase in cash holdings that I document
in this paper suggest that the reform was largely enforced.22
Why was the 2006 trade credit regulation reform adopted in the ﬁrst place? The regulation of
payment terms had been on the European agenda for a number of years. On June 29, 2000, the
European Commission adopted Directive 2000/35/EC designed to prevent late payment practices.
This initiative was based on the belief that long payment terms were costly for businesses, especially
smaller ones. It created a statutory right to receive interest payments after thirty days following
the date of the invoice, unless another payment period was agreed upon in the contract. In July
2011, a Directive 2011/7/EU was adopted to harmonize maximum payment terms at sixty days.23
The main motivation for this directive lies in the widely spread view among European policymakers
that long payment terms impose excess default risk on small businesses.24 The deadline for Member
States to transpose this new regulation into their respective national laws was March 16, 2013.
The adoption of a reform speciﬁcally targeting French trucking ﬁrms is somewhat accidental.
The law was part of a legislative package that targeted the safety of French transportation. The
trade credit regulation was not part of the initial draft prepared by the government. It was intro-
duced in later rounds of parliamentary discussions, with an amendment submitted when the Act
was discussed in the Senate.25 This explains why the reform does not seem to have been antici-
pated in any way. Payment terms were subsequently restricted to forty-ﬁve days in the remainder
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of the French economy in 2009. This suggests that the trade credit restriction was going to be
implemented anyway, irrespective of the characteristics of the trucking sector.
B. Contemporaneous Legislation
To ensure that the results presented in this paper are indeed caused by the drop in payment
terms, I examine whether other legislation adopted at the same time might be driving the results
in one direction or another. First, given that the trade credit reform was part of an Act targeting
the safety and development of French transportation, one concern might be that other provisions
of the new law might also have an eﬀect on trucking ﬁrms. Table CI in the Internet Appendix
presents a summary of all the Articles of the Act. While most of these provisions are unlikely to
directly aﬀect the trucking sector, the Act introduced a price adjustment mechanism for long-term
contract prices, opened rail freight to competition, and created an experimental tax in one of the
French regions, which could have aﬀected trucking ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst paragraph of Section D of the
Internet Appendix, I describe these provisions in more detail and show that they do not seem to
be driving the results.
While the other provisions in the legislative package are unlikely to be driving the results, it is
important to also check whether other legislation pertaining to the trucking industry was enacted
during the sample period. I searched all European directives adopted between 1995 and 2008 and
the acts transposing them into French law, as well as any pieces of legislation including the words
“road transportation”. The main legislative changes that occurred over this period pertained to
the harmonization of labor regulations and toll systems across E.U. Member States. In the second
paragraph of Section D of the Internet Appendix, I set out these legislative changes in detail, and
present evidence that they do not seem to be aﬀecting the estimates.
Finally, another concern may be that broader reforms adopted in France at the same time as
the trade credit regulation reform might aﬀect the results. The fact that the identiﬁcation strategy
relies on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach, which controls for economy-wide shocks aﬀecting both
treated and control ﬁrms, mitigates these concerns. However, if the treatment and control groups
are diﬀerentially exposed to these reforms, and if the eﬀect of these reforms is large enough, then
the results might be biased in one direction or another. In the third paragraph of Section D of the
Internet Appendix, I discuss whether the estimates presented in the paper could be aﬀected by the
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introduction in 2006 of an Act aﬀecting immigration law, and an Act aﬀecting bankruptcy law.
I ﬁnd that neither of these pieces of legislation could explain the variation in defaults and entry
observed following the trade credit regulation reform.
C. The Trucking Industry in France
The French trucking industry is comparable to its U.S. counterpart26 and represents a substan-
tial share of the French economy. As of 2003, the industry employs approximately 440,000 workers
and generates combined sales of approximately 60 billion euros. According to the 2003 input-output
table of the French economy, the largest three-digit sector supplying the trucking sector is oil and
gas, which represents 22% of its input. Its main downstream three-digit sector is the wholesale
sector, which accounts for 29% of its aggregate output.
Road transportation is the dominant transportation mode. Table AII in the Internet Appendix
presents the share of road transportation out of total transportation in France between 2003 and
2008. It is remarkable that only a small share (about 15%) of road transportation is internalized.
Moreover, this proportion is stable through time, suggesting that the demand for external road
transportation services is quite inelastic and did not collapse following the restriction. However,
although road transportation is a signiﬁcant business segment of the economy, it represents only a
small share of average production costs. Using the input-output tables of the French economy in
2003, I ﬁnd that the weighted average share of transportation costs across industries’ input is lower
than 1%. This mitigates the concern that the regulation might have had large general equilibrium
eﬀects in the French economy, which would aﬀect the estimates of its impact on trucking ﬁrms.
III. Identiﬁcation Strategy
A. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences Setting
I analyze the response of trucking ﬁrms to the 2006 trade credit regulation in a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences (DID) setting. This allows for a clean analysis of the eﬀect of the restriction on payment
terms by controlling for any trends that might aﬀect the French economy as a whole. I build the
control group conservatively, by including ﬁrms that are unlikely to be using trucking services, and
that have a similar position in the supply chain, which the literature has found to be an important
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determinant of trade credit supply. To do so, I use the 2003 input-output table of the French
economy at the three-digit level and split the sample based on (i) the share of trucking services
out of the total input of each sector, (ii) the distance between the vectors of output shares of each
sector and the trucking sector, and (iii) the distance between the vectors of input shares of each
sector and the trucking sector. I restrict the sample to sectors falling in the ﬁrst tercile of (i) the
share of trucking services, (ii) the distance between vectors of output shares, and (iii) the distance
between vectors of output shares.
The control group includes four three-digit industries and a total of twenty-seven four-digit
industries. Unsurprisingly, it essentially includes business support services, as evidenced in Table I.
From an economic perspective, these sectors are relevant controls for the trucking industry, to the
extent that they occupy a similar position in the supply chain, which is likely to drive not only
their supply of trade credit prior to the reform, but their investment opportunities as well.
[Place Table I about here]
Treated and non-treated ﬁrms could, however, diﬀer along a number of dimensions, which might
be correlated with the outcome variables and bias the estimation in one direction or another. To
overcome this issue, I control for ﬁrms’ initial characteristics, as well as their interaction with a Post
dummy. These controls ensure that the results are not driven by the pre-reform diﬀerences between
treated and non-treated ﬁrms. They prevent the estimation from being biased if the treatment
and control groups vary in their sensitivity to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations due to heterogeneous
distributions of ﬁrm characteristics, such as size, proﬁtability, or leverage. I ﬁrst compare the
behavior of treated and control ﬁrms in the three years prior (2003 to 2005) and the two or three
years following the reform, depending on data availability. I do so by running the following ﬁrm-level
OLS regression.
Yi,t = α1 + α2Post.T reatedi + α3Post.Xi + ηt + δi + i,t, (1)
where Yi,t is the outcome of interest measured in year t for ﬁrm i. Post is a dummy equal to one in
the years following the reform and zero in the three years prior to the reform. Treated is a dummy
indicating whether ﬁrm i belongs to the treatment or the control group. Xi is a vector of ﬁrm-level
controls measured in 2003 including the log of assets, the ratios of sales to assets, gross proﬁt to
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assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, and leverage to assets. ηt and δi are respectively year and ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects, and i,t is an error term. Xi does not enter separately in the baseline regression because
it is absorbed by ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. In the analysis of corporate defaults, however, where ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects are not included, the vector of ﬁrm-level controls enters separately in the regression.
The Post dummy is never included separately because it is absorbed by year ﬁxed eﬀects. In all
speciﬁcations, standard errors are clustered at the four-digit sector level (Bertrand, Duﬂo, and
Mullainathan, 2004). The coeﬃcient of interest is α2, which measures the change in Yi following
the reform for trucking ﬁrms, relative to their controls.
I check in Section B of the Internet Appendix that all results are robust to substituting the
interaction of controls with the Post dummy in the OLS regression for a matching procedure. To
do so, I match each trucking ﬁrm in the treatment group with a non-treated ﬁrm belonging to the
same quartile of assets, ratio of sales to assets, gross proﬁts to assets, debt to assets, receivables
over sales, and ﬁxed assets to assets in 2003. When a treated ﬁrm has several matches, I keep
the non-treated ﬁrm with the smallest Euclidean distance in terms of all matching variables after
standardizing them. Again, this procedure ensures that the results are not driven by pre-reform
diﬀerences between treated and control ﬁrms along observable dimensions.
I then analyze how the impact of the reform varies with the intensity of ﬁnancing frictions. I
follow Fazzari et al. (1988), Almeida et al. (2004), Hadlock and Pierce (2010), and others, and use
ﬁrms’ size, age, ratio of cash holdings to assets, ratio of leverage to assets, and payout policy to
measure ﬁnancial strength. I ﬁrst rank ﬁrms based on size in 2003, three years prior to the reform.
I ascribe ﬁrms to the ﬁnancially stronger group if the book value of their assets lies in the top
half of the sample distribution in 2003. The intuition of using size is that small ﬁrms are more
vulnerable to capital market imperfections (Almeida et al., 2004). Moreover, Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) show that size is the strongest predictor of ﬁnancial constraints, along with age. Hence, I
also rank ﬁrms based on their age in 2003. Firms are classiﬁed as ﬁnancially stronger if they fall
within the top half of the sample distribution of age in 2003. Leverage and cash holdings have
been associated with ﬁnancial strength in a number of studies, including Chevalier (1995a,b), and
Fresard (2010). Hence, I split the sample based on the ratio of cash holdings to assets (net of
accounts receivable) and allocate ﬁrms to the ﬁnancially stronger group if they lie in the top half of
the sample distribution in 2003. Conversely, I split the sample based on the ratio of total leverage
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to assets and allocate ﬁrms to the ﬁnancially stronger group if they lie in the bottom half of the
sample distribution in 2003. Finally, I follow Fazzari et al. (1988) and measure ﬁnancial strength
based on ﬁrms’ payout policy. Firms are allocated to the ﬁnancially stronger group if the average
ratio lies in the top half of the sample distribution. All proxies are arguably imperfect measures of
ﬁnancial constraints. However, to the extent that I ﬁnd consistent results across these measures,
they are useful in pinning down how the eﬀect of the reform varies in relation to the intensity of
ﬁnancing frictions.
I run the same OLS regression as above, augmented with the interaction of the Post.T reatedi
variable with FCi (ﬁnancially constrained) and NonFCi (non ﬁnancially constrained), two dum-
mies which capture the intensity of ﬁnancial constraints based alternatively on ﬁrm size, age, payout
policy, cash holdings, and leverage:
Yi,t = β1+β2Post.T reatedi.FCi+β3Post.T reatedi.NonFCi+β4Post.FCi+β5Post.Xi+ηt+δi+i,t,
(2)
In this speciﬁcation, β2 measures the change in Yi following the reform for ﬁnancially weaker
trucking ﬁrms relative to their ﬁnancially weaker controls. β3 measures the change in Yi following
the reform for ﬁnancially stronger trucking ﬁrms relative to their ﬁnancially stronger controls.
B. Internal Validity
A crucial assumption for the DID estimation to be valid is that the treatment and control
groups should follow parallel trends in the absence of a restriction on payment terms. Since the
reform occurs at the industry level, the parallel trends assumption might not hold if there are
diverging latent trends between treatment and controls. In Figure II, I plot the average cumulative
change in receivables over sales of treated and control ﬁrms from 2003 to 2007, along with 1%
conﬁdence intervals. The graph shows that the two groups follow parallel trends prior to the
reform. Receivables of treated ﬁrms then drop sharply following the introduction of the law. This
conﬁrms that control ﬁrms are similar to treatment ﬁrms in terms of trade credit provision prior
to the reform.
[Place Figure II about here]
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A related concern is that the decline in corporate defaults and the increase in entry were caused
by some trends speciﬁc to the trucking sector, rather than by the trade credit regulation itself. The
fact that the control group includes sectors that have similar suppliers and customers as trucking
ﬁrms should mitigate this concern. However, suppose that there was a spike in corporate defaults in
the trucking industry in the years prior to the reform. Policies such as the trade credit regulation
reform could have been implemented in response to this situation. The subsequent decline in
corporate default could result from the reversion of default rates to their pre-spike level, rather
than being caused by the trade credit reform itself. To check whether this is the case, I inspect the
level of corporate default rates in the treatment and control groups in the six years prior to the
restriction. I construct corporate default rates as the ratio of corporate defaults in the treated and
control groups to the number of ﬁrms ﬁling tax forms in the previous year. The results presented
in Figure AI in the Internet Appendix indicate that there is no spike in default rates that would
cause a reversion around the timing of the reform. Instead, the change in default rates seems to
occur precisely after the adoption of the law. Furthermore, in the analyses presented in Section V,
I split the Post dummy into year dummies, and show that the eﬀect of the reform on defaults and
entry only kicks in following the restriction.
Another concern might be that the reform was passed at a time when investment opportunities
in the trucking sector improved relative to the treatment group. Reassuringly, Table AIII in the
Internet Appendix shows that the total output of the trucking sector does not change compared
with the output of the control industries around the restriction. When such a reform is being
passed, one might also be concerned that it is more likely to be lobbied for by large ﬁrms with
better political connections, which can ensure that the reform is adopted precisely at the time
when they expect to gain the most. In this case, the reform helped small ﬁrms, which are arguably
the ones with the fewest connections. For the reform to be endogenous to the results, it would
thus have to be the case that there would be better opportunities for ﬁnancially constrained than
for unconstrained ﬁrms, and that perhaps because constrained trucking ﬁrms managed to lobby
harder, the reform was implemented right at that time. However, I am conﬁdent that this is not
driving the results since the reform was extended to the rest of the economy two years later.27
Finally, although ﬁrms in the control groups have similar customers and suppliers as trucking
ﬁrms, and are therefore likely to be similarly exposed to macroeconomic shocks, it could still be the
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case that default and entry in the two groups have a diﬀerential sensitivity to some macroeconomic
variables, such as GDP growth. Table AI in the Internet Appendix presents key macroeconomic
indicators for the French economy over the sample period. Real GDP growth is slightly higher on
average in the pre- than in the post-period (1.74% versus 1.64%). If the trucking sector had a lower
sensitivity to the business cycle, this might explain why corporate default goes down, and why
entry goes up in the post-period. To check whether this is the case, I estimate the beta of treated
and control ﬁrms’ cash-ﬂows with respect to GDP, using all available data from 1995 to 2005, as the
covariance between the change in EBITDA scaled by lagged assets (all variables are deﬂated and
are therefore expressed in real terms), and real GDP growth, divided by the variance of real GDP
growth.28 Table AV in the Internet Appendix shows that conditional on other ﬁrm characteristics,
the beta of ﬁrms cash-ﬂows with respect to GDP is slightly larger in the treatment than in the
control group, but not signiﬁcantly so. If anything, given that real GDP growth is slightly lower in
the post-period, this should bias the results against ﬁnding a drop in defaults and an increase in
entry. Furthermore, in some of the tests described in Section V, I interact the treatment dummy
with GDP growth and changes in fuel costs and ﬁnd that this does not aﬀect the main coeﬃcient.
Overall, the evidence indicates that the exposure of treated and control ﬁrms to macroeconomic
shocks is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, and unlikely to bias the estimates.
IV. Data
A. Firm Characteristics
I use accounting data extracted from tax ﬁles used by the French Ministry of Finance for
corporate tax collection purposes, available up to 2007. This source is an extended version of the
dataset used in various studies, including Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007). It includes the
balance sheets and proﬁt and loss statements of the universe of incorporated French ﬁrms.29 The
data is not publicly available, but is available for academic research through a procedure similar
to accessing Census data in the U.S. Relative to the NSSBF, this data source has the advantage
of tracking ﬁrms through time and of being free from the misreporting concerns usually associated
with survey-based data. Relative to Compustat, the dataset has the advantage of covering the
population of ﬁrms, which allows for precise analysis of entry and exit. I track ﬁrms through time
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with their unique identifying number ascribed by the French Statistics Oﬃce (INSEE). I allocate
ﬁrms to the treatment and control groups using their historical four-digit industry classiﬁcation
code, which is very similar to the SIC coding system in the U.S. Codes are ascribed to each ﬁrm
by the French Statistics Oﬃce itself. I exclude the ﬁnancial and real estate sectors, which have
diﬀerent accounting standards. I also exclude utilities, non-proﬁt, and regulated sectors, as they
have speciﬁc default procedures.30
B. Measuring Trade Credit Supply
The trade credit regulation reform of 2006 applies to contractual payment terms. Information
at the contract level is unavailable. Hence, I proxy for payment terms with the ratio of accounts
receivable on ﬁrms’ balance sheets at the end of their ﬁscal year to the their annual sales.
While this measure has been widely used in the literature as a proxy for trade credit provision, it
is only a rough proxy for actual payment terms. Importantly, this ratio mechanically overestimates
average payment terms during periods of growth and underestimates them during downturns. If
sales increase in the second half of the year, the ratio of end-of-year accounts receivable to total
sales overestimates the true average payment term. This explains why the accounting ratio of
receivables to sales tends to increase in boom years and decrease in bust years.31 This makes it all
the more important that the control group should include ﬁrms with similar patterns to trucking
ﬁrms, and that all regressions should include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Second, accounts receivable on the balance sheet mechanically overestimate the true level of
contractual payment terms. Firms record sales in their books at the time when the property of
supplied goods changes hands, but they often invoice their customers afterwards. Since payment
terms are often based on the time of invoicing, the time between the actual sale and payment is
usually longer than the true contractual payment term. Suppose, for instance, that a ﬁrm organizes
all its invoicing at the end of each month and oﬀers thirty days to all its customers. If the ﬁrm
produces and sells continuously during the month, then the average eﬀective time between a sale
and a payment (thirty days after invoicing) is forty-ﬁve days. In this case, the ratio of accounts
receivable to sales observed on the books implies an average payment term of forty-ﬁve days.
To prevent outliers from aﬀecting the results, I ﬁlter out observations with a ﬁscal year of more
or less than twelve months, or with a ratio of accounts receivable to sales larger than one, and I
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winzorise all ratios at the 1% level.
C. Corporate Defaults and Entry
The main outcome variables in this paper are corporate defaults and business creations.32 For
the analysis of corporate defaults, I use a ﬁle produced by the French Statistics Oﬃce that reports
an exhaustive list of all corporate default initiations along with the unique identifying number of
the corresponding company between 2003 and 2008. The date of the initiation corresponds to the
time when the relevant court opens the bankruptcy procedure, which takes place soon after the top
management has ﬁled a report stating that the ﬁrm cannot cover its short-term liabilities. This
data is uniquely suited to test the hypotheses developed in Section I. Its main limitation is that it
does not specify whether the ﬁrm ends up being liquidated or reorganized following the initiation
of the bankruptcy procedure. I construct a dummy for liquidations that takes the value of one in
the year of the initiation of a corporate default procedure if the ﬁrm is administratively terminated
in the same or the following year, a detail that appears in the tax ﬁles. Unfortunately, this proxy
may also capture business sales that are not actual liquidations, but that result in a change in the
tax identiﬁer. As such, it may overestimate the number of “pure” liquidation outcomes.
I also measure the probability that trucking ﬁrms miss a payment to their own suppliers. I
obtain an exhaustive list of payment defaults from the CIPE (“Fichier Central des Incidents de
Payment sur Eﬀets”), a dataset maintained by Banque de France that contains information on all
ﬁrms’ payment defaults related to trade bills (with the exception of checks) from 2003 to 2008.33
When a ﬁrm misses a payment on a trade bill, its bank is required by law to notify the default to
Banque de France within four working days. The great feature of this data is that it includes the
reason for the payment default, such as a disagreement on the delivery of the goods, the illiquidity
of the ﬁrm, or the insolvency of the ﬁrm once it has ﬁled for bankruptcy. For the purpose of this
paper, I focus on payment defaults due to the illiquidity of the ﬁrm. These payment defaults are
recorded whenever there are insuﬃcient funds in the ﬁrm’s account to cover the payment, prior to
the initiation of any corporate default procedure.
Finally, I obtain from the French Statistics Oﬃce the list of all business creations from 1993 to
2008, including the month of creation and an estimation of the number of employees at creation.
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V. Results
A. Summary Statistics
Table II presents descriptive statistics that compare treated and control ﬁrms. Panel A shows
the summary statistics for the sample of incumbents. Control ﬁrms have slightly higher cash
holdings, slightly lower ﬁxed assets, and slightly higher gross proﬁt margins than treated ﬁrms.
Their default probability is also slightly higher than in the treatment group. Even though these
diﬀerences are economically small, I ensure that they do not drive the results by including a vector of
ﬁrm-level characteristics interacted with Post in the regressions. Additionally, I present in Section B
of the Internet Appendix the summary statistics of the matched control group, which includes
the nearest neighbor to each treated ﬁrm based on the quantile matching procedure described
in Section III. Unsurprisingly, the treated and matched control groups are much closer on all
dimensions, as evidenced in Table BI.
[Place Table II about here]
B. Average Impact of the Trade Credit Restriction
[Place Table III about here]
I start with the DID estimation of the payment term restriction on the average trucking ﬁrm.
Table III presents the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation (2006) on the level of payment terms.
Unsurprisingly, treated ﬁrms experience a signiﬁcant drop in receivables by 3.3 percentage points.
This amounts to a 15% drop with respect to the pre-reform level. Adding ﬁrm-level controls slightly
lowers the coeﬃcient, which remains highly economically and statistically signiﬁcant. I then split
the Post into year dummies. I ﬁnd no diﬀerential behavior across treated and control ﬁrms prior
to the reform. This suggests that the parallel trend assumption is satisﬁed, which is crucial for
the validity of the DID estimate. The drop in payment terms starts in the year of the restriction,
and is ampliﬁed thereafter. The reason why the eﬀect is gradual is that the reform applies only to
contracts signed after it was enacted. Table BII in the Internet Appendix shows that the results
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are similar to those obtained using the matched control group, which makes it very unlikely that
diﬀerences in the characteristics of trucking ﬁrms and their controls are driving the results.
[Place Table IV about here]
I then estimate how the balance sheet of trucking ﬁrms reacts to this substantial drop in payment
terms. The results presented in Table IV, show a large decrease by 4.4 to 4.6 percentage points in
the share of receivables in assets. Most of this decrease is oﬀset by a signiﬁcant increase in cash
holdings by 3.5 percentage points, a 25% increase with respect to their level prior to the shock. The
fact that trucking ﬁrms hold less cash than they would if payment terms were shorter is consistent
with the prediction of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) that constrained ﬁrms hold lower cash balances
than they would if the initial cash outlay was lower. The drop in receivables leads to a modest
increase in ﬁxed assets by 0.7 to 0.9 percentage points, as evidenced in Columns 5 and 6 of Table IV.
I also examine whether the reform has an eﬀect on leverage, and in particular on short-term
debt. The results presented in Columns 7 and 8 of Table IV show a drop by 0.7 percentage points
in the ratio of debt to assets, and the coeﬃcient is marginally signiﬁcant. To be able to see which
component of debt is aﬀected by the change, I use more detailed data on debt structure, available
for a subset of ﬁrms. I ﬁrst regress total bank debt scaled by assets on the Post×Treated dummy
as well as year and ﬁrm dummies, and initial controls interacted with Post. I then split total
bank debt into (i) credit lines and overdrafts, and (ii) total debt minus credit lines and overdrafts.
The results are presented in Table AIV in the Internet Appendix. The ﬁrst two columns show
that total debt over assets drops by 0.7 percentage points. Columns 5 and 6 show that the drop
is concentrated in credit lines and overdraft facilities, which drop by 0.6 percentage points. Yet,
there is no meaningful change in other forms of bank debt, as evidenced in Columns 3 and 4. This
analysis suggests that trucking ﬁrms are less reliant on credit lines following the restriction, which
is consistent with the ﬁnding in Petersen and Rajan (1997) that lines of credit appear to be directly
ﬁnancing accounts receivable.
[Place Table V about here]
I then turn to the analysis of corporate defaults, the main outcome variable of interest. Table V
presents the DID estimate of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation (2006) on defaults between
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2003 and 2008.34 There is a very strong average eﬀect of the restriction on the probability of
default, which decreases by 60 basis points, a one-fourth drop with respect to its average prior to
the reform. The coeﬃcients are not aﬀected by the inclusion of a vector of initial controls interacted
with the Post dummy. This ensures that this ﬁnding is not due to the diﬀerences in observable
characteristics, such as size, proﬁtability, or leverage, between ﬁrms in the treatment and control
groups. Columns 2 and 4 indicate that there is no prior trend in the eﬀect, which again conﬁrms
that the parallel trend assumption seems to be satisﬁed. The eﬀect starts in 2006 and is ampliﬁed
one year after the reform. The fact that the eﬀect becomes gradually stronger is consistent with the
results presented in Table III. In Table BIV in the Internet Appendix, I replicate the speciﬁcations
using the matched control group and ﬁnd stronger results, which ensures that the baseline ﬁndings
are not driven by systematic ex-ante ﬁrm-level diﬀerences between the trucking ﬁrms and their
controls.35
Altogether, the ﬁndings suggest that payment terms expose ﬁrms to liquidity risk, leading them
to experience corporate default more often than they would if they extended less trade credit. I test
the robustness of these results to alternative proxies for illiquidity. I start by checking that following
the restriction, trucking ﬁrms are less likely to default on payments due to their own suppliers. I
consider a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm has defaulted on a payment to one of its suppliers, due
to a lack of suﬃcient funds in its bank account, and zero otherwise. While payment defaults do
not necessarily imply that the ﬁrm will ultimately experience ﬁnancial distress, corporate default
is usually triggered by missed payments to suppliers or to other creditors. The estimates presented
in Panel A of Table VI show that the restriction on payment terms strongly reduces the probability
that trucking ﬁrms miss a payment to their own suppliers. The estimates are insensitive to the
inclusion of a vector of initial controls interacted with the Post dummy. The eﬀect is insigniﬁcant in
the year prior to the reform, thus suggesting that trends in the trucking sectors are not driving this
result. The reduction is highly signiﬁcant in the year of the reform and is ampliﬁed thereafter. This
conﬁrms that ﬁrms are more likely to default on their suppliers when they extend long payment
terms to their customers.
[Place Table VI about here]
The results presented in Table V may have limited implications for industry dynamics if ﬁrms
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are merely reorganized, but keep operating after a corporate default. I check that the restriction
leads to fewer ﬁrm liquidations by using a dummy equal to one if a corporate default procedure is
initiated in that year, and if the ﬁrm is administratively terminated in the same or the following
year. This proxy might also capture business sales that are not actual liquidations, but that result
in a change in the tax identiﬁer. The estimates presented in Panel B of Table VI highlight that the
restriction leads to a sharp decrease in liquidations. Again, including a vector of initial controls
interacted with the Post dummy does not aﬀect the estimates. The eﬀect starts in the year of
the reform and grows afterwards. Subject to the caveat regarding the measurement of liquidation
outcomes, the results overall highlight that long payment terms increase the probability of corporate
liquidation.
[Place Figure III about here]
Although the ﬁrm-level data do not allow me to assess whether the eﬀect persists beyond three
years after the reform, I present in Figure III the evolution of payment terms and bankruptcies in
the transportation sector and the business services sector from 2003 to 2011 as disclosed by Banque
de France. Panel A presents the cumulative change in receivables over sales, while Panel B presents
the cumulative change in the log annual number of bankruptcies. The graphs show that the gap
in defaults between the treatment and control groups starts widening only after the restriction. It
somewhat shrinks with time, which might be due to the fact that a 45-day restriction on trade
credit across sectors was adopted in 2009, but it remains large and signiﬁcant in the sixth year
following the restriction. This suggests that the reform did not simply delay the exit of ineﬃcient
ﬁrms, but had a long-lasting eﬀect on the sector-wide probability of ﬁnancial distress. In addition,
the dynamics presented in this graph make it unlikely that the drop in corporate defaults was due
to a diﬀerential reaction of trucking ﬁrms to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, otherwise the drop would
have been reversed sometime after the restriction.
To ensure that diﬀerences in the sensitivity of treated and control ﬁrms to GDP growth are
indeed not driving the results, I augment the baseline speciﬁcation with the interaction of the Post
variable and the beta of the ﬁrms’ cash-ﬂows with respect to GDP, as well as the beta itself.36 If the
drop in defaults or the increase in entry are driven by the diﬀerential beta of the treated and control
group, then this variable should absorb most of the coeﬃcient on the Post×Treated dummy. The
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results of this experiment are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table AVI in the Internet Appendix.
The coeﬃcient on this additional variable is insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient on the Post×Treated
dummy remains unaﬀected. This makes it unlikely that systematic diﬀerences in the beta of ﬁrms’
cash-ﬂows with respect to GDP might explain the results. I then go one step further and augment
these speciﬁcations with the interaction between the treatment dummy and real GDP growth. If
the decrease in defaults is due to a diﬀerential exposure to GDP growth, then this variable should
capture most of the eﬀect of the treatment. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that this variable does not
predict defaults, and does not aﬀect the main coeﬃcients. Finally, I also check that the results are
not driven by diﬀerential exposure of treated and control ﬁrms to changes in fuel costs. Annual fuel
cost changes are slightly higher in the pre- than in the post-period (17% versus 11% on average), as
evidenced in Table AI in the Internet Appendix. If it takes longer for trucking ﬁrms to adjust their
prices to variations in fuel costs, then sudden increases in these costs might temporarily reduce their
proﬁtability and increase the risk of ﬁnancial distress. I include the interaction of the treatment
dummy with the change in fuel costs in the main speciﬁcation. I present the results in Columns 5
and 6 of Table AVI. The coeﬃcient on this interaction term is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
and does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on the Post×Treated dummy. Hence the drop in defaults cannot
be driven by diﬀerential exposure of the treated and control groups to GDP growth or variations
in fuel costs.
C. Trade Credit Restriction and Financial Strength
Next, I measure how the eﬀect of the reform on defaults varies with the intensity of liquidity
constraints. As detailed in Section III, I measure ﬁnancial strength by ranking ﬁrms based on asset
size, ﬁrm age, cash holdings, leverage, and payout ratio in 2003.
If extending long payment terms is indeed very costly for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, we might
expect that such ﬁrms attempt to manage down their liquidity risk by requiring shorter payment
terms, or by selecting quickly paying customers at the margin. Table AX in the Internet Appendix
presents the diﬀerence in the mean level of receivables over sales across all ﬁve measures used in the
paper to proxy for the intensity of ﬁnancial constraints. Along these ﬁve dimensions, ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrms extend more credit than ﬁnancially weaker ones, which is consistent with the
idea that it is less costly for them to do so. This suggests that constrained ﬁrms grant slightly shorter
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payment terms to their customers, or that they collect their receivables more quickly than their
unconstrained rivals. However, while these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant, they are small
relative to the level of receivables over sales, consistent with the idea that it is hard for constrained
ﬁrms to deviate much from the payment terms extended by ﬁnancially stronger incumbents.
[Place Table VII about here]
Table VII presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation (2006) on
defaults between 2003 and 2008 conditional on the ﬁve proxies for ﬁnancial strength. Financially
weaker ﬁrms experience a drop by 80 to 140 basis points in their default probability. The default
probability of ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms decreases by much less. In fact, low leverage, cash-rich and
high payout ﬁrms do not experience any decrease in their probability of default. The diﬀerence
between the coeﬃcient on Post × Treated × FC and Post × Treated × NonFC is presented at
the bottom of the table. It is negative and strongly signiﬁcant across all proxies for the intensity
of ﬁnancial frictions. This conﬁrms that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms expose themselves to higher
corporate default risk in order to extend payment terms to their customers.
[Place Table VIII about here]
[Place Table IX about here]
I then ask whether ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are compensated for the liquidity risk they
take in extending trade credit supply. It may be that constrained ﬁrms charge higher prices than
unconstrained ones to cover their higher liquidity risk. I check whether ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms
experience an oﬀsetting decline in proﬁts following the restriction. I run a similar regression for
gross proﬁts scaled by sales (proﬁt margin), and for gross proﬁts scaled by beginning of the year
assets (return on assets). I present the results in Table VIII and IX. Proﬁt margins seem to
decrease slightly, which is the natural consequence of the fact that prices should go down in the
trucking sector due to the lower implicit interest payment on the reduced amount of credit supplied.
However, the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant, and there is no evidence of a diﬀerential decline
in earnings for ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms. The ﬁndings indicate that while suppliers bear more
liquidity risk by extending payment terms, they do not pass this excess risk onto prices. A natural
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interpretation of these results is that the competitive pressure prevents them from doing so. This
suggests that the subset of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms within the trucking industry might have
been made better oﬀ by the restriction.
I explore whether the diﬀerential drop in default might be explained by a diﬀerential change in
the nature of the lending activity of constrained and unconstrained trucking ﬁrms. First, the larger
drop in the defaults of constrained ﬁrms might be explained if they experienced the largest reduction
in receivables after the restriction. In Figure AII in the Internet Appendix, I plot the evolution of
receivables over sales in the years around the reform for constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms (solid
versus dashed line) in the treatment and control groups (dark versus light line). The ﬁve panels
show that unconstrained ﬁrms typically have larger accounts receivable over sales than constrained
ones in both the control and treatment groups. Both constrained and unconstrained treated ﬁrms
experience a drop in receivables following the restriction, but it is slightly more pronounced for the
latter than for the former. These results are conﬁrmed in Table X and imply that the larger drop
in the defaults of constrained ﬁrms cannot be explained by a larger drop in their receivables.
[Place Table X about here]
In addition, if the trade credit policy of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms was riskier prior to the
restriction, and if the reduced maturity of their trade credit loans made them less risky, this might
explain why they end up defaulting less often after the reform. I consider accounting allowances for
doubtful receivables, which are available for a subset of ﬁrms. This balance sheet item represents the
amount of receivables that ﬁrms expect will not be repaid. Firms have incentives to report doubtful
receivables on their books since this is a tax-deductible expense. In Table XI, I show that the share
of doubtful receivables did not decrease for ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms following the restriction, and not
diﬀerentially so with respect to ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms. Hence, the large reduction in corporate
defaults, and the absence of an oﬀsetting drop in proﬁts, cannot be explained by diﬀerential trade
credit practices. Therefore, although the trade credit reform restricts their ability to freely contract
with their customers, it seems that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms beneﬁt from the reform.
[Place Table XI about here]
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D. Entry in the Trucking Sector
I then study whether the liquidity risk associated with trade credit supply acts as a barrier to
entry for ﬁnancially constrained entrepreneurs. Given that the large drop in defaults is not oﬀset
by a drop in proﬁtability, we might see an increase in the entry of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms in
the trucking sector, as ﬁrms realize that they can sustain the same level of earnings as before with
a higher probability of survival.
To check whether this is the case, I compare the number of small and large business creations in
the treated and non-treated sectors, deﬁned at the four-digit level. Once again, I restrict the set of
controls to sectors not using transportation services and those with similar distributions of upstream
suppliers and downstream customers. I run the same regression as in the previous section, at the
sector level and at a monthly frequency. There are thirty-three four-digit sectors in the sample,
including six treated ones. The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the number of new
businesses in a given sector in a given month. I ﬁrst consider all business creations, and then the
number of small, medium, and large businesses, respectively deﬁned as businesses with zero, one
or two, and more than two employees at the time of creation. While the number of employees at
creation is admittedly a crude proxy for the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints, it is available for
each new business creation, which is unfortunately not the case with accounting variables. Initial
sector controls are the average of the ratios of sales to assets, gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to
assets, leverage to assets, and receivables to sales in each sector measured in 2003.
[Place Table XII about here]
Table XII presents the results of this experiment. The restriction leads to a 14% increase in new
business creations. The eﬀect shows no prior trend, consistent with the assumption that treated
and control ﬁrms would follow parallel trends in the absence of the reform. The eﬀect kicks in
one year after the restriction is implemented. This does not come as a surprise, given that the
incorporation of new businesses takes some time. The eﬀect is driven by smaller ﬁrms, consistent
with the idea that ﬁnancially weaker entrepreneurs beneﬁt the most from the reform. These ﬁndings
thus indicate that payment terms act as a barrier to the entry of constrained entrepreneurs.
To ensure that diﬀerences in the sensitivity of entry to GDP growth between the treatment and
control groups are not driving the results, I augment this speciﬁcation with (i) the interaction of
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the Post variable and the sector average beta of ﬁrms’ cash-ﬂows with respect to GDP,37 (ii) the
interaction between the treatment dummy and real GDP growth, and (iii) the interaction between
the treatment dummy and changes in fuel costs. The results presented in Table AVII in the Internet
Appendix show that the coeﬃcients on these additional variables are insigniﬁcant, and that their
inclusion does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on the Post×Treated dummy. Hence the increase in entry
cannot be driven by diﬀerential exposure of the treated and control groups to GDP growth or
variations in fuel costs.
The inﬂow of new entrants might be driven by low quality entrepreneurs attracted to the
trucking sector because of the lower working capital requirements. To check whether this is the case,
I compare the cohorts of entrants in 2003 to 2004 and 2006 to 2007 in the treated and control groups.
I ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of the restriction on the survival of newly created businesses. In Panel A
of Table XIII, I measure the probability of survival in the ﬁrst three years following creation. I ﬁnd
that the probability that new businesses default within year 2 or 3 decreases substantially, by 1.6 to
1.8 percentage points. To assess the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs entering the trucking sector
following the restriction, I then consider some proxies for the productivity of these new businesses
in their ﬁrst or second year of activity whenever the following information is available: the ratio
of sales to the number of employees, value added to the number of employees, and gross proﬁt to
the number of employees. Results presented in Table XIII indicate that new businesses established
following the restriction are not less productive than those that entered before.
[Place Table XIII about here]
VI. Discussion
A. Impact of the Trade Credit Restriction on Transport Users
For constrained ﬁrms to expose themselves to liquidity risk in order to extend payment terms, it
should be the case that their customers rely crucially on supplier ﬁnancing to fund their operations,
and that there are no easy substitutes for trade credit. If there were, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms
would probably oﬀer much shorter payment terms to manage down their liquidity risk.
I attempt to check whether this is the case. I consider the impact of the trade credit restriction
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on transport users. I use a survey conducted in 2005 by the French Statistics Oﬃce on a sample of
4,900 manufacturing ﬁrms with more than twenty employees or total sales in excess of ﬁve million
euros, which reports the total amount of external transportation services purchased by each ﬁrm.
I compute the intensity of external transportation as the ratio of external transportation services
purchased to total purchases in 2005. I then label the top two quintiles of the distribution as
Transport users and the bottom two quintiles as Non-transport users. I compare the evolution of
payables and inventories for Transport and Non-transport users between 2003 and 2007. I then
contrast the impact of the reform on Transport users in the top and bottom half of the distribution of
asset size in 2003. The results presented in Table AXI in the Internet Appendix indicate that small
transport users experience a decrease by 1.3 percentage points in payables over total purchases.
This drop seems to be passed on to their inventories, which decrease by 0.9 percentage points, as
a proportion of total purchases. Although these ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution, they
suggest that some customers rely crucially on trade credit received by trucking ﬁrms. Following
the restriction, they have to reduce their inventories to oﬀset this cut in external ﬁnancing.38
B. External Validity
To what extent can the results be extrapolated to other contexts? The trucking industry is
competitive, and faces a relatively inelastic demand. If the demand for trucking services was very
elastic to payment terms, we might have seen a collapse in the demand for trucking services in the
ﬁrst place. In less competitive industries, individual ﬁrms might be able to pass higher liquidity
risk onto prices, which would probably weaken the eﬀect of a restriction in payment terms on entry.
Speciﬁcities of the French economy might also limit the external validity of the experiment.
However, trade credit supply is an important dimension of ﬁrms’ corporate policies both in France
and the rest of the world. In December 2005, immediately before the trade credit reform, accounts
receivable represented 9.5% of the aggregate balance sheet of nonﬁnancial businesses according to
Banque de France, versus 8.6% of the aggregate balance sheet of nonﬁnancial businesses in the
U.S. according to the Flow of Fund accounts. Moreover, prior work by Blazy, Chopard, and Nigam
(2013) shows that even distressed ﬁrms carry comparable amount of accounts receivable on their
balance sheet in France and in the United Kingdom, a common law country.
I check whether the determinants of trade credit supply are similar in other samples widely
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used in the trade credit literature, such as the NSSBF. In Table AXII in the Internet Appendix,
I replicate Table 3 of Petersen and Rajan (1997) on my sample in 2003. The dependent variable
is receivables over sales, which I regress on the log of assets, the log of age and its squared value,
net proﬁt over sales, a variable equal to sales growth if it is positive and zero otherwise, a variable
equal to sales growth if it is negative and zero otherwise, as well as gross margin, and a squared
term. I ﬁnd very similar results as Petersen and Rajan (1997): larger ﬁrms extend more trade
credit. Older ﬁrms also extend more credit to their customers, although the relationship is non
linear. Both ﬁrms with positive and negative sales growth have larger accounts receivable, while
ﬁrms making losses extend more credit. Finally, the larger a ﬁrm’s gross proﬁt margin, the greater
its receivables over sales. This analysis suggests that the drivers of trade credit provision in the
cross-section of ﬁrms are similar in my sample and in the NSSBF.
Finally, if indeed trade credit prevents the entry of ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms, then it should be
the case that sectors with longer payment terms also have lower entry rates. I take advantage of
the unique dataset covering the whole population of French ﬁrms to check whether this prediction
is validated in the data. I compute for each year and four-digit sector the entry rate as the ratio
of new business creations to the number of ﬁrms ﬁling taxes in the previous year. I then regress
entry rates on lagged median sector characteristics, including the ratio of receivables to sales, and
present the results in Table AXIII in the Internet Appendix. Consistent with the ﬁndings presented
in this paper, the entry rate of small businesses is strongly negatively correlated with the level of
payment terms. However, the opposite applies to the entry rate of large ﬁrms. These ﬁndings
suggest that the mechanism documented in this paper for the trucking industry can be generalized
to the cross-section of sectors.
VII. Conclusion
This paper asks whether ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms have a comparative advantage over their
constrained rivals through their ability to extend trade credit to their customers. To test this
hypothesis and its implications, I consider the response of French trucking ﬁrms to a reform re-
stricting their ability to agree with their customers to payment terms in excess of thirty days. The
reform triggers an abrupt reduction of payment terms by 15% in the trucking sector. This causes
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a large drop in corporate defaults, which shows no prior trends, is persistent, and concentrated
among ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms. I do not ﬁnd any evidence that this large reduction in default risk
is oﬀset by a decrease in earnings. Hence, ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms seem to be better oﬀ following
the restriction. Consistent with this view, the entry of small businesses increases in the trucking
sector following the trade credit restriction; moreover, these new entrants are not less productive.
This suggests that long payment terms extended by ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms raises the cost for
ﬁnancially constrained but productive ﬁrms to enter and survive in the industry.
The results shed light on the impact of the reforms currently undertaken in Europe and the
U.S. to regulate trade credit and accelerate payments to small businesses. Reducing payment terms
seems to facilitate the entry and survival of constrained ﬁrms. However, because it restricts the
contract set and reduces the supply of trade credit for customers, such a restriction is clearly not
Pareto optimal. For such a restriction to be welfare enhancing, there should be an excess demand
or supply of trade credit, a question that I leave for future research.
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Notes
1As of September 2012, according to the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts.
2Antra`s and Foley (2011) analyze the sales of a large U.S.-based producer of frozen and refriger-
ated food products, exporting its production to 140 countries. They ﬁnd that accounts receivable
support 39.2% of total sales and 78.2% of sales to common law countries.
3Among notable exceptions are the supplier-customer datasets used in Antra`s and Foley (2011)
or Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012).
4Unless otherwise speciﬁed, I use the term “ﬁrms” throughout the paper to refer to trucking and
control ﬁrms that are extending trade credit, and the term “customers” to refer to their customers,
who are thus receiving trade credit.
5See http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/09/14/getting-money-small-businesses-faster
6See Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2013, “EU targets late payers.”
7See, Financial Times, March 25, 2010, “Late payments push smaller companies into bankruptcy.”;
the Kauﬀman Foundation survey results summarized in Robb and Reedy (2012); or EU Commission
MEMO/12/742, October 5, 2012 , “Let’s stop business closures caused by late payments.”
8Recent contributions to the literature on trade credit include Wilner (2000), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2001), Frank and Maksimovic (2005), Cun˜at (2007), Giannetti et al. (2011),
Antra`s and Foley (2011), Dass, Kale, and Nanda (2014), Kim and Shin (2012), Klapper et al.
(2012), (Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013), and Murﬁn and Njoroge (2014). I defer
a thorough analysis of this literature to Section I.
9The idea that trade credit has implications for ﬁrms’ product market performance has been
explored in studies including Nadiri (1969), Brennan et al. (1988), Blazenko and Vandezande (2003),
and Daripa and Nilsen (2011).
10There is empirical evidence from prior work consistent with this view including Meltzer (1960),
Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995), Nilsen (2002), Taketa and Udell (2007), or Love,
Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007)
11 Subsequent studies have complemented these ﬁndings using exogenous variations in cash ﬂows
(Blanchard, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, 1994; Lamont, 1997; Rauh, 2006; Faulkender and Pe-
tersen, 2012) or structural models (Whited, 1992).
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12Another, more recent stream in the literature explores the extent to which trade credit might
serve as a remedy to contractual frictions between trade partners, see for instance Fisman and
Raturi (2004), Van Horen (2007), Dass et al. (2014), or Kim and Shin (2012). These theories
mostly apply to environments where the quality of goods or services supplied is hard to verify.
Such theories are less likely to be relevant in the context of this paper given that the quality of a
transportation service is likely to be revealed quickly following the delivery.
13Related to this paper, Murﬁn and Njoroge (2014) use variations in large retailers’ cash man-
agement policies to investigate the real impact of those cash management strategies on the (small)
suppliers of those ﬁrms. They show that constrained suppliers are forced to cut back on investment
in new plants and equipment when buyers pay more slowly.
14In practice, even when receivables are securitized or factored, the seller virtually always retains
a fraction of the default risk. The factoring market was not developed in France during the sample
period, with less than 1% of bank loans on aggregate and less than 0.5% of bank loans in the
trucking sector.
15A natural concern is that such a restriction might lead to a collapse in the demand for trucking
services if the customers of trucking ﬁrms can easily ﬁnd substitutes for trucking services. The
evidence presented in Section II indicates that the demand for trucking services is inelastic and
does not collapse following the restriction. Nonetheless, this would make it even harder to ﬁnd a
negative eﬀect of the payment term restriction on corporate defaults.
16One would expect that prices might go down slightly for all ﬁrms in the trucking sector following
the restriction, due to the lower implicit interest payments on the reduced amount of credit supplied.
However, if constrained ﬁrms were able to pass their default risk onto prices, the drop in prices
should be larger for them.
17Note that if the restriction led to a collapse in the demand for trucking services, it would make
it even harder to observe an eﬀect on entry.
18 These ﬁgures are computed by Banque de France using their proprietary database, FIBEN,
which includes roughly one-third of the ﬁrms of the main sample used in this paper. Banque
de France disclose their statistics at the two-digit sector level. The transportation and logistics
sector also includes air and waterways transportation. However, the trucking sector accounts for
approximately 70% of ﬁrms in this sample.
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19Note that the ex-post level of receivables over sales does not reach the equivalent of 30/365 of
annual sales. There are mechanical reasons for this, which I discuss in Section IV. Moreover, the
reform does not aﬀect contracts signed prior to the reform or contracts signed by trucking ﬁrms
but unrelated to actual transportation services.
20The default penalty rate is the reﬁnancing rate of the European Central Bank (ECB) + 7
percentage points. The lowest penalty rate allowed by the law is 1.5 times the legal interest rate
set by Banque de France, which was 3.3% in 2003. If the ﬁrm was asking for a larger penalty rate
prior to the restriction, it could get around the reform by charging a lower penalty rate for late
payment.
21The 30-day term is computed from the invoice date. Suppose that a ﬁrm invoiced its customer
10 days following delivery prior to the restriction. The ﬁrm could decide to send the invoice 20
days following delivery, thereby extending the eﬀective payment term for the customer.
22While the law applies to any contract when one of the two parties is French, another concern
could be that enforcement might be weaker when one of the parties is a foreign ﬁrm. Fortunately,
the trucking sector is essentially non-tradable: there are very few imports and exports of trucking
services. The results are unchanged when I exclude ﬁrms that were exporting prior to the reform
and ﬁrms located in districts located close to a border (See Table AVIII in the Internet Appendix).
23See Financial Times, April 29, 2010, “EU late payment law moves a step closer.”
24See E.U. Commission MEMO/12/742, October 5, 2012 , “Let’s stop business closures caused
by late payments.”
25Amendment number 16, submitted by Senator Charles Revet.
26It is, however, less concentrated: while the U.S. trucking industry is constituted of large com-
panies hiring many employee drivers, there are more independent contractors owning and driving
their own trucks in France (Arrunada, Gonzalez-Diaz, and Fernandez, 2004). The characteristics
of the U.S. trucking industry have been thoroughly described in the work of Baker and Hubbard
(2003, 2004) and Hubbard (2000, 2001, 2003), who show that the introduction of on-board comput-
ers (OBCs) has two opposite eﬀects on the structure of this industry: OBCs’ incentive-improving
capabilities leads to larger, more integrated ﬁrms, while OBCs’ resource-allocation-improving ca-
pabilities leads to smaller, less integrated ﬁrms.
27Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 2006 reform was lobbied for by trucking unions and
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lobbied against by freight transportation user organizations. The main trucking union in France,
the FNTR, has approximately 12,500 member ﬁrms, mostly small and medium sized businesses.
Transport user organizations include the AUTF, the Association of Freight Transport Users. More
generally, there are two major professional organizations in France: the small business organization
(CGPME), and the large business organization (MEDEF). The regulation of payment terms has
always been on the agenda of the small business organization and never on the agenda of the large
business organization.
28I obtain similar results when I scale the change in EBITDA by lagged EBITDA, or when I
compute the covariance of the change in cash-ﬂows to the change in aggregate cash-ﬂows in my
sample rather than real GDP growth.
29The sample is restricted to ﬁrms with more than two hundred euros in sales in 2003. A similar
approach is adopted in Bertrand et al. (2007). This restriction does not aﬀect the results.
30Given that some ﬁrms might default in 2003 and not report to the tax administration in that
year, I use the latest balance sheet information to construct controls.
31Additionally, seasonality might aﬀect the quality of receivables over sales as a proxy for payment
terms. Suppose that prior to the reform, treated ﬁrms provided no trade credit in the ﬁrst semester
and large amounts of trade credit in the second semester. Then, suppose that following the reform,
they adopted the opposite behavior. In this case, I might overestimate the impact of the reform.
However, it is unlikely that the seasonality of ﬁrms in the sample changes dramatically after 2006.
32Throughout the paper, I use the terms bankruptcy or corporate default interchangeably.
33This rich dataset is also used in Boissay and Gropp (2013)
34The analysis relies on a linear model to avoid the issues highlighted in Ai and Norton (2003).
35Moreover, the results are unlikely to be driven by better opportunities in the treated and
control sectors. Table AIII in the Internet Appendix, which compares the log aggregate sales and
value added in the treated and control sectors before and after the restriction, shows no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the two.
36See Section III.B for the computation of the beta.
37See Section III.B for the computation of the beta.
38Smaller inventories are likely to lead to more frequent shortfalls, which amounts to a drop in
product quality, as suggested in Matsa (2011a) and Matsa (2011b), for instance.
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Figure I. Receivables over sales in the transportation sector in France, 1996–2011.
This ﬁgure shows the historical payment terms, proxied by the ratio of receivables to sales in the
transportation sector in France from 1996 to 2011. These series are produced by Banque de France,
based on their proprietary database, FIBEN, which includes roughly one-third of the ﬁrms of the
main sample used in this paper. Banque de France discloses their statistics at the two-digit sector
level. Tucking ﬁrms account for approximately 70% of ﬁrms in the transportation sector. The
dashed lines denote 1% conﬁdence intervals. The vertical line denotes the adoption of the trade
credit regulation reform (2006).
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Figure II. Trends in payment terms among treated and control ﬁrms. This ﬁgure
shows the average cumulative change in payment terms, proxied by the ratio of receivables to sales,
around the trade credit regulation reform (2006) in the treated and control groups. The trucking
industry is the treated group (15,987 ﬁrms). The control group includes the sectors closest to the
trucking industry in terms of input and output and that are not using transportation services. The
dashed lines denote 1% conﬁdence intervals. The vertical line denotes the adoption of the trade
credit regulation reform (2006).
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Figure III. Long-term impact of the trade credit regulation reform, 2003–2011. This
ﬁgure shows the long-term eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on payment terms
and defaults (Panel B). Each panel contrasts the eﬀects of the reform on the transportation sector
with the evolution of payment terms and defaults in the rest of the French economy and on the
business services sector, which serves as the main control group in the paper. Banque de France
discloses their statistics at the two-digit sector level. Tucking ﬁrms account for approximately 70%
of ﬁrms in the transportation sector. Panel A presents the cumulative change in mean receivables
over sales. Panel B presents the cumulative change in the log number of defaults. The vertical line
denotes the adoption of the trade credit regulation reform (2006).
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Table I
Treated and controls
This table presents the composition of the treatment and control groups. The trucking industry is the treated group
(15,987 ﬁrms). To construct the control group, I use the 2003 input-output table of the French economy at the
three-digit level and split the sample based on (i) the share of trucking services out of the total input of each sector,
(ii) the distance between the vectors of output shares of each sector and the trucking sector, and (iii) the distance
between the vectors of input shares of each sector and the trucking sector. I restrict the sample to sectors falling in
the ﬁrst tercile of (i) the share of trucking services, (ii) the distance between vectors of output shares, and (iii) the
distance between vectors of output shares. The control group includes twenty-seven sectors.
Sector (3-digit) Nb. of ﬁrms (2003) % Cum. %
Treated Road transportation 14,112 88% 88%
Organization of cargo transportation 1,875 12% 100%
Total 15,987
Controls Business services 14,373 84% 84%
Electrical equipment 1,589 9% 93%
Electric motors, generators, and transformers 663 4% 97%
Machine tools 482 3% 100%
Total 17,107
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Table II
Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics prior to the trade credit regulation reform (2006) for the main variables used
in the analysis. The trucking industry is the treated group (15,987 ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven
sectors that are closest to the trucking industry in terms of input and output and that are not using transportation
services. Panel A presents ﬁrm-level statistics for the analysis of the eﬀect of the trade credit reform (2006) on
trucking ﬁrms. Panel B presents sector-level statistics on entry. Panel C presents ﬁrm-level statistics on new ﬁrms.
Panel A: Firm-level statistics (2003): incumbents
Treated Controls
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Receivables over sales 15020 0.225 0.114 15980 0.216 0.148
Receivables over assets 15020 0.503 0.207 15980 0.418 0.253
Cash holdings over assets 15020 0.140 0.158 15980 0.192 0.206
Fixed assets over assets 15020 0.234 0.181 15980 0.213 0.206
Gross proﬁt margin 15020 0.063 0.117 15980 0.074 0.175
Return on assets 15020 0.149 0.316 15980 0.188 0.420
Default dummy 15987 0.025 0.157 17107 0.020 0.139
Panel B: Sector-level statistics (2003)
Treated Controls
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Log monthly nb. of ﬁrms +1 72 2.76 1.50 324 1.60 1.87
Log monthly nb. of small ﬁrms +1 72 2.42 1.48 324 1.47 1.84
Log monthly nb. of medium ﬁrms +1 72 1.56 1.27 324 0.66 1.04
Log monthly nb. of large ﬁrms +1 72 0.99 0.99 324 0.45 0.80
Panel C: Firm-level statistics (2003): entrants
Treated Controls
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Sales per employee 1393 89.411 106.375 2460 73.794 96.456
Value added per employee 1393 31.612 24.454 2460 29.856 31.836
Gross proﬁt per employee 1393 7.568 15.941 2460 5.459 21.762
Default within one year 1393 0.000 0.000 2460 0.000 0.000
Default within two years 1393 0.024 0.154 2460 0.015 0.120
Default within three years 1393 0.069 0.253 2460 0.053 0.224
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Table III
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Payment Terms
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on receivables over
sales, which proxy for payment terms. Post is a dummy equal to one in the two years following the reform (2006 and
2007) and zero in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking industry is the treated
group (15,987 ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking industry in terms of
input and output, and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are measured in (or prior to) 2003 and
include the ratios of gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets, sales to assets, and the log of assets.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Receivables over sales
Post × Treated -0.033*** -0.035***
(0.003) (0.003)
Treated × Year= t− 1 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Treated × Year= t -0.027*** -0.030***
(0.002) (0.002)
Treated × Year> t -0.038*** -0.041***
(0.003) (0.004)
Post × Initial controls No No Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136855 136855 136855 136855
R2 0.781 0.782 0.783 0.783
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Table V
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Default
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on corporate defaults.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in the year when a corporate default procedure is initiated, and
zero before that. Post is a dummy equal to one in the three years following the reform (2006, 2007, and 2008) and
zero in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking industry is the treated group (15,987
ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking industry in terms of input and output,
and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are measured in (or prior to) 2003 and include the ratios of
gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets, sales to assets, and the log of assets. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1,
5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Corporate default dummy
Post × Treated -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
Treated × Year= t− 1 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Treated × Year= t -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Treated × Year> t -0.008*** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003)
Post × Initial controls No No Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 172889 172889 172889 172889
R2 0.008 0.008 0.033 0.033
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Table VI
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Payment Defaults and Liquidations
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on payment defaults
and liquidations. In Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the company misses a payment on
one of its suppliers and zero otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in the year when
a liquidation procedure is initiated, and zero before that. Post is a dummy equal to one in the three years following
the reform (2006, 2007 and 2008) and zero in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking
industry is the treated group (15,987 ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking
industry in terms of input and output, and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are measured in (or
prior to) 2003 and include the ratios of gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets, sales to assets, and
the log of assets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Payment default dummy
Post × Treated -0.015*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.003)
Treated × Year= t− 1 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Treated × Year= t -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Treated × Year> t -0.018*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004)
Post × Initial controls No No Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 172889 172889 172889 172889
R2 0.013 0.013 0.034 0.034
Panel B: Liquidation dummy
Post × Treated -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.002)
Treated × Year= t− 1 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Treated × Year= t -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Treated × Year> t -0.007*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.003)
Post × Initial controls No No Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 172889 172889 172889 172889
R2 0.007 0.007 0.031 0.031
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Table VII
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Defaults, Conditional on Financial
Strength
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on corporate defaults.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in the year when a corporate default procedure is initiated, and
zero before that. Post is a dummy equal to one in the three years following the reform (2006, 2007, and 2008) and
zero in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking industry is the treated group (15,987
ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking industry in terms of input and output,
and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are measured in (or prior to) 2003 and include the ratios
of gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets, sales to assets, and the log of assets. FC and NonFC
are two dummies measuring whether the ﬁrm’s exposure to ﬁnancial constraints is high or low. FC (NonFC ) equals
one for ﬁrms in the bottom (top) half of the 2003 sample distribution of (i) payout ratio, (ii) one minus the leverage
ratio, (iii) cash holdings over assets, (iv) age, and (v) book value of assets, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1,
5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Corporate default dummy
Payout Leverage Cash Age Size
Post × Treated × FC -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Post × Treated × NonFC 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.003** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Post × FC 0.004* 0.015*** 0.002 -0.003* 0.004
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Treated × FC 0.011** 0.019*** 0.009** 0.015*** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
FC 0.005 -0.007* 0.015*** 0.012*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Post × Initial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 172889 172889 172889 172889 172889
R2 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.033
Diﬀerence FC versus NonFC -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.006** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
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Table VIII
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Proﬁt Margins, Conditional on
Financial Strength
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on ﬁrms’ proﬁt margin,
measured as the ratio of gross proﬁt to sales. Post is a dummy equal to one in the two years following the reform
(2006 and 2007) and zero in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking industry is
the treated group (15,987 ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking industry in
terms of input and output, and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are measured in (or prior to)
2003 and include the ratios of gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets, sales to assets, and the
log of assets. FC and NonFC are two dummies measuring whether the ﬁrm’s exposure to ﬁnancial constraints is
high or low. FC (NonFC ) equals one for ﬁrms in the bottom (top) half of the 2003 sample distribution of (i) payout
ratio, (ii) one minus the leverage ratio, (iii) cash holdings over assets, (iv) age, and (v) book value of assets, and zero
otherwise. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Proﬁt margin
Payout Leverage Cash Age Size
Post × Treated × FC -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Post × Treated × NonFC -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Post × FC -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.006** -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Post × Initial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136855 136855 136855 136855 136855
R2 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684 0.684
Diﬀerence FC versus NonFC 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
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Table IX
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Return on Assets, Conditional on
Financial Strength
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on ﬁrms’ return on
assets, measured as the ratio of gross proﬁt to the book value of assets. Post is a dummy equal to one in the two
years following the reform (2006 and 2007) and zero in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005).
The trucking industry is the treated group (15,987 ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest
to the trucking industry in terms of input and output, and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are
measured in (or prior to) 2003 and include the ratios of gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets,
sales to assets, and the log of assets. FC and NonFC are two dummies measuring whether the ﬁrm’s exposure to
ﬁnancial constraints is high or low. FC (NonFC ) equals one for ﬁrms in the bottom (top) half of the 2003 sample
distribution of (i) payout ratio, (ii) one minus the leverage ratio, (iii) cash holdings over assets, (iv) age, and (v) book
value of assets, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Return on assets
Payout Leverage Cash Age Size
Post × Treated × FC -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Post × Treated × NonFC 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Post × FC 0.005 0.011 -0.003 0.020** 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Post × Initial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 134709 134709 134709 134709 134709
R2 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676
Diﬀerence FC versus NonFC -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.000
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
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Table X
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Payment Terms, Conditional on
Financial Strength
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on the ratio of
receivables over sales. Post is a dummy equal to one in the two years following the reform (2006 and 2007) and zero
in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking industry is the treated group (15,987
ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking industry in terms of input and output,
and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are measured in (or prior to) 2003 and include the ratios
of gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets, sales to assets, and the log of assets. FC and NonFC
are two dummies measuring whether the ﬁrm’s exposure to ﬁnancial constraints is high or low. FC (NonFC ) equals
one for ﬁrms in the bottom (top) half of the 2003 sample distribution of (i) payout ratio, (ii) one minus the leverage
ratio, (iii) cash holdings over assets, (iv) age, and (v) book value of assets, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1,
5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Receivables over sales
Payout Leverage Cash Age Size
Post × Treated × FC -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Post × Treated × NonFC -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.040***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Post × FC 0.004* 0.003 0.013*** -0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Post × Initial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136855 136855 136855 136855 136855
R2 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783
Diﬀerence FC versus NonFC 0.006* 0.003 0.011*** 0.005* 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
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Table XI
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Trade Credit Defaults, Conditional on
Financial Strength
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on trade credit defaults
(allowance for doubtful receivables over receivables). Post is a dummy equal to one in the two years following the
reform (2006 and 2007) and zero in the three years prior to the reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking industry
is the treated group (15,987 ﬁrms). The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking industry
in terms of input and output, and that are not using trucking services. Initial controls are measured in (or prior to)
2003 and include the ratios of gross proﬁt to assets, ﬁxed assets to assets, debt to assets, sales to assets, and the
log of assets. FC and NonFC are two dummies measuring whether the ﬁrm’s exposure to ﬁnancial constraints is
high or low. FC (NonFC ) equals one for ﬁrms in the bottom (top) half of the 2003 sample distribution of (i) payout
ratio, (ii) one minus the leverage ratio, (iii) cash holdings over assets, (iv) age, and (v) book value of assets, and zero
otherwise. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Share of doubtful receivables
Payout Leverage Cash Age Size
Post × Treated × FC 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post × Treated × NonFC 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Post × FC 0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post × Initial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118182 118182 118182 118182 118182
R2 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750
Diﬀerence FC versus NonFC 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table XII
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Entry
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on the entry of new
ﬁrms at the four-digit sector-level (33 sectors). The dependent variable is the log of the monthly number of new
business creations plus one. I consider successively the entry of all ﬁrms, the entry of small (no employees at creation),
medium (one or two employees at creation), and large ﬁrms (more than two employees at creation). Post is a dummy
equal to one in the three years following the reform (2006, 2007, and 2008) and zero in the three years prior to the
reform (2003, 2004, and 2005). The trucking sector is the treated group and includes six four-digit sectors. The
control group includes twenty-seven four-digit sectors closest to the trucking industry in terms of input and output,
and that are not using trucking services. Initial sector controls are measured in 2003 and include the average of the
ratio of gross proﬁt to assets, the ratio of ﬁxed assets to assets, the ratio of debt to assets, the ratio of sales to assets,
and the ratio of receivables to sales. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Log monthly nb. of ﬁrm creations + 1
All ﬁrms All ﬁrms Small ﬁrms Medium ﬁrms Large ﬁrms
Post × Treated 0.14** 0.18*** 0.04 -0.04
(0.059) (0.060) (0.045) (0.042)
Treated × Year= t− 1 -0.01
(0.040)
Treated × Year= t -0.01
(0.088)
Treated × Year> t 0.21**
(0.095)
Post × Initial sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of the year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376
R2 0.960 0.961 0.961 0.935 0.896
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Table XIII
Eﬀect of the Trade Credit Reform (2006) on Entrants
This table presents the DID estimates of the eﬀect of the trade credit regulation reform (2006) on entrants. Panel
A considers the probability that entrants experience a corporate default after business creation. Panel B considers
various proxies for the eﬃciency of entrants, such as sales per employee, gross proﬁt per employee, and value added
per employee measured if the company ﬁles in the ﬁrst or second year after creation. Post is a dummy equal to one if
the ﬁrm was created in 2006 or 2007 and zero if it was created in 2003 or 2004. The trucking industry is the treated
group. The control group includes twenty-seven sectors closest to the trucking industry in terms of input and output,
and that are not using trucking services. Initial sector controls are measured in 2003 and include the average of the
ratio of gross proﬁt to assets, the ratio of ﬁxed assets to assets, the ratio of debt to assets, the ratio of sales to assets,
and the ratio of receivables to sales. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the sector-level and presented in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Entrants’ survival
Default Default Default
within year 1 within year 2 within year 3
Post × Treated 0.000 -0.016*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
Post × Initial sector controls Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66670 66670 66670
R2 0.001 0.004 0.013
Panel B: Entrants’ eﬃciency
Sales Value added Gross proﬁt
per employee per employee per employee
Post × Treated 6.958 1.741 1.169
(6.010) (1.374) (1.749)
Post × Initial sector controls Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes
Year of ﬁling FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13761 13761 13761
R2 0.143 0.068 0.015
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